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Abstract 
People believe others are telling the truth more often than they actually are, called the 
truth bias. Surprisingly, when a speaker is judged at multiple points across their statement 
the truth bias declines. Previous claims argue this is evidence of a shift from (biased) 
heuristic processing to (reasoned) analytical processing. In four experiments we contrast the 
heuristic-analytic model (HAM) with alternative accounts. In Experiment 1, the decrease in 
truth responding was not the result of speakers appearing more deceptive, but was instead 
attributable to the rater’s processing style. Yet contrary to HAMs, across three experiments 
we found the decline in bias was not related to the amount of processing time available 
(Experiment 1-3) or the communication channel (Experiment 2). In Experiment 4 we find 
support for a new account: that the bias reflects whether raters perceive the statement to be 
internally consistent. 
 
Keywords: dual-process theory; deception detection; truth bias; heuristic processing; 
consistency; smart lie detector. 
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Introduction 
When judging if someone is lying or not, naïve observers are biased towards 
believing the speaker is telling the truth (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Levine, Park, & 
McCornack, 1999; Vrij, 2008). A number of explanations have been proposed for this truth 
bias, such as the availability, anchoring, or falsifiability heuristics, or social conversational 
rules and self-presentational concerns of the deception judge (see Vrij, 2008). Among 
relational partners, the truth bias has been attributed to relational trust (see Miller and Stiff, 
1993). According to Bond and DePaulo’s (2006) double standard framework, people 
believe liars are tormented, shameful, and conscience stricken, and so display nervous 
behavior. Since lies told in laboratory settings are low-stake and most everyday lies are of 
little consequence and easy to rationalize by the liar, liars normally do not show indicators 
of anxiety, shame or guilt, and hence are judged to be honest (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Our 
starting point here is still another explanation of the truth bias, one that contends that it is a 
consequence of heuristic processing. 
Humans can process information either heuristically or analytically. Heuristic 
processing results in fast, intuitive judgments (Evans, 2007) and consumes little cognitive 
resources (Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly, 1989). Unfortunately, it shows systematic biases 
(Chaiken et al., 1989). Analytic processing is slower and requires greater effort and 
cognitive resources than heuristic processing, but it may be less biased (Chaiken et al., 
1989). 
Although there are diverse characterizations of heuristic-analytic models (HAMs; see, 
for instance, Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Gilbert, 1999), we used Evans’s (2007) taxonomy 
because it allows for testable predictions to be generated from a broad and general 
theoretical framework (see Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Other authors, however, have come 
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to similar classifications (e.g., Gilbert’s, 1999, corrective, competitive, and selective 
designs correspond closely to the three kinds of HAMs proposed by Evans). Evans (2007) 
identified several general classes of HAMs. The first class, called default-interventionist 
models, claims that heuristic processing is the default processing mode, but it can be 
interrupted by analytic processing provided enough time is available. The second class, 
parallel-competition models, proposes both heuristic and analytical processes run 
simultaneously. However, if only a short processing time is available heuristic processing is 
more likely to be the basis of a judgment. Crucially, in both cases heuristic processing is 
more likely with shorter processing times (Evans, 2007; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Stupple & Ball, 2008; see also Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter & Campbell, 2003; 
Trippas, Verde & Handley, 2014). 
Unlike analytical processing, heuristic processing might yield truth-biased judgments. 
According to Gilbert, Krull and Malone (1990), incoming information (e.g., a 
communication message) is first “represented as true before their validity can be rationally 
assessed” (p. 611), and “disbelief requires extra effort” (Vrij, 2008, p. 149). While heuristic 
processing is fast, automatic and immediate, the extra-effort needed to analytically assess a 
message to see whether it should be disbelieved requires time. Therefore, if processing time 
is short, then truth judgments will be more likely than if processing time is long. 
Research has supported this notion. Interrupting people while they are deciding if a 
smile is true or false creates a truth bias (Gilbert et al., 1990, Study 2), and time pressure 
similarly increases the likelihood of believing information (Gilbert, Tafarodi & Malone, 
1993). Also, to analytically assess a message enough information must be available; this 
information may be absent if the message is too short. Because of these reasons, the truth 
bias should be more pronounced with shorter processing times. 
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Typically, in deception detection research, videotaped truths and lies are shown to 
observers who have to immediately judge whether each sender in the videotape is lying or 
telling the truth. Masip, Garrido, and Herrero (2006, 2009, 2010) observed that in many 
studies the video clips are so brief and potentially uninformative that analytical processing 
may not happen. They reasoned that this might explain why deception research has 
typically found a truth bias. Masip et al. conducted two studies in which people watched a 
video recorded mock crime and then lied/told the truth in answering three questions about 
the crime. Their answers were videotaped and subsequently shown to raters. The raters 
judged each speaker’s honesty after each of the three responses, aware that any given 
speaker either always lied or always told the truth across the three responses of their 
statement. Consistent with a heuristic account, raters were truth biased when judging the 
speaker’s first response, but became less biased when judging the second and third 
responses. 
Although Masip et al. (2010) acknowledged that their results are open to alternative 
interpretations, they favoured the HAM interpretation. Here we first considered whether the 
change in bias could be explained simply as a change in the speaker’s behaviour, rather 
than having anything to do with the cognitions of the rater. Having found support for a 
cognitive account of the bias (Experiment 1), we then moved on to more closely examine 
two competing cognitive accounts, namely HAM-based (Experiments 1-3) and step-by-step 
(Experiments 3-4) response mode explanations. 
Account 1: Behavioural Explanation 
Labelling excessive truth responding as a “bias” implies it is an erroneous tendency 
of the rater. Yet the truth “bias” may not be a cognitive bias, but a valid inference made 
from the available behaviours. That is, it is not the raters who become less truth-biased, but 
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rather the speakers who give off cues that appear less honest. For instance, liars may 
conceivably become more nervous over time or display suspicious behaviours. Truth-
tellers, generally confident that “the truth will come out” (Kassin, 2005; Masip & Herrero, 
2013), may not. In this case, truth-tellers’ behaviours would appear honest across their 
statement whereas liars would become increasingly unconvincing. This could explain the 
phenomenon of the truth bias declining over time. 
To begin to support a heuristic-analytical account, we had to show that the decline in 
truth bias occurs independently of the senders’ behaviour, i.e., that there is a cognitive 
component to the bias. We adopted Masip et al.’s (2009) paradigm. Observers watched 
video-recorded speakers giving three consecutive truthful or deceptive responses to an 
interviewer’s questions. Observers had to indicate whether each speaker was lying or 
telling the truth after watching each of the three responses. It is important to note the 
presentation order (order in which each speaker’s responses were shown to raters) in Masip 
et al.’s studies was the same as the recording order (order in which the responses had been 
recorded). We reversed the presentation order in one condition so that the last recorded 
response was viewed first and vice versa. The behavioural account predicts that in the 
reverse order the truth bias should increase over successive judgments because speakers 
would appear more honest in their first recorded (last presented) response. The cognitive 
account predicts that the bias should decline irrespective of condition. 
Account 2: Heuristic-Analytic Account 
Masip et al. (2006, 2009) found a decline in the truth bias between each of three 
speaker’s responses. Although the judgment number (1st, 2nd, 3rd) is a proxy of viewing 
time, some speakers provided lengthy responses whereas others were shorter, and so it is an 
inaccurate proxy. Analytic processing should intervene at a given time, not after a given 
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number of ratings: the analytical process either takes longer to engage (default-
interventionist models) or longer to complete processing (parallel-competitive models) 
(Evans, 2007). For this reason, we examined the following two issues: 
(a) How the total amount of processing time available (i.e., the cumulative speaking 
time until the end of the third response) influenced bias and accuracy. 
(b) How the duration of the first presented response influenced bias and accuracy. 
This was examined because if the speaker’s initial response is particularly long, raters may 
shift to analytical processing during the first response. 
To support a HAM account, the truth bias should decrease and accuracy should 
increase when there is greater time to process information. 
Account 3: Step-by-Step Response Mode 
If processing time cannot explain the decline in bias, but judgment number can, then 
it must be the very act of making multiple judgments that has a causal effect in the decision 
process. Granhag and Strömwall (2001a) showed that raters who made a judgment after 
watching an interview and another judgment after watching two subsequent interviews 
were more accurate than those who only made a single judgment after watching all three 
interviews. Importantly, in these two conditions the total viewing time was identical. The 
authors explained the improved accuracy in terms of assessment through a step-by-step 
response mode (making repeated assessments of veracity) instead of an end-of-sequence 
response mode (making just one final assessment). By reflecting on previous decisions in 
light of new information, observers using a step-by-step response mode could attain greater 
accuracy. 
By examining the impact of viewing duration on truth judgments and accuracy, we 
also sought to test the influence of judgment time separately from the act of making a 
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judgment. To support a step-by-step response mode account, a decline in biased responding 
should be evident across the multiple ratings, but it should be independent of the time the 
rater had to process the information. 
In summary, we addressed three potential explanations for the decline in truth 
judgments across a speaker’s statement. The first explanation proposes it may be that 
speakers appear more deceptive over time (the behavioural account), meaning the bias shift 
is attributable to speakers’ actions, not to the raters’ processing style. If there is a cognitive 
component to the bias, there are two additional explanations. The second, currently 
favoured explanation is that the truth bias reflects a shift from heuristic to analytical 
processing (the HAM account). In this case, the decline should be related to the amount of 
processing time available. The third explanation suggests it is the act of making multiple 
judgments that causes the decline in bias (the step-by-step account). 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In line with Masip et al. (2006, 2009, 2010) and with a cognitive account of the bias, 
we predicted:  
(a) That the proportion of truth judgments (PJT) would decline over successive 
ratings irrespective of whether the speaker’s first or last recorded response was presented 
initially.  
(b) That accuracy would improve over successive ratings. 
Because using the point of judgment may not be a valid proxy of time, we also 
examined:  
(c) The cumulative duration of the speaker’s responses until the moment of rating. 
(d) The influence of the duration of the speaker’s first presented response on raters’ 
PJT and accuracy.  
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In both cases, longer durations were expected to yield a smaller PJT and greater 
accuracy rates. 
Method 
Eighty-three psychology undergraduates (66 female; age M = 20.75, SD = 0.20, 
range: 18 - 35) participated. 
Materials 
The video stimulus set was adopted from Masip et al. (2006, 2009). Speakers (n = 
24) were shown one of two videotapes with a scene depicted by three characters. The 
videotapes displayed either an attempted or successfully completed theft. After viewing the 
footage, speakers were interviewed twice about the actions of each character in the 
videotape. They had to respond honestly during one interview and deceptively during the 
other. Both interviews had the same questions, which were: “Describe in detail what the 
man with a moustache [man in a suit/woman] did; I remind you that you have to tell the 
truth [lie]”. Question order, whether the speaker lied/told the truth first, and mock-crime 
videotape were counterbalanced. Later, the 48 video-recorded interviews (24 truthful and 
24 deceptive) were divided into four video sets with six liars and six truth tellers in each 
set. The same speaker never appeared lying and telling the truth in the same set. For the 
current study, we selected the video set that achieved PJT and accuracy ratings most 
representative of the overall results in Masip et al.’s (2009) research (Video Set A1). 
Further details can be found in Masip et al. (2006). The first recorded response lasted on 
average 50 s, Response 2 averaged 37 s and Response 3 averaged 39 s. Duration 
differences were not statistically significant, F (2, 35) = 0.26, p = .776, ηp2 = 0.01. 
Two versions of Video Set A1 were created. In the first version (used in the direct 
viewing condition) the three responses of each speaker were presented in the same order in 
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which they had been recorded. In the second version (used in the reverse viewing 
condition) the speaker’s third recorded response was presented first, followed by the second 
recorded response, and then by the first one. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were allocated randomly to the direct (n = 44) or reverse viewing 
condition (n = 39). Sex and age distributions did not differ substantially between 
conditions. The procedure replicated Masip et al.’s (2009), with the exception of the 
viewing direction manipulation. 
Groups of participants took part in two sessions per condition. They were apart so 
they could not see each other’s responses. Instructions explained they would see 12 
speakers, that each speaker provided a single statement based on a videotaped event, that 
each statement consisted of three responses, and that a statement was either deceptive or 
truthful across the three responses. After each response, the video was stopped and the 
participants marked in a booklet their lie-truth judgment and their confidence (on a 1-to-7 
scale, with higher values indicating more confidence). Raters were explicitly told that in 
judging each speaker’s 2nd or 3rd response they were free to either make the same 
judgment or to change it if they changed their opinion. In analysing the data we examined 
the changes in the raters’ judgments across the three responses of each sender, not across 
different senders, statements, or topics. In other words, the primary independent variable 
was the speaker’s response (1st, 2nd, 3rd), not statement number (1 through 12). 
The PJT and accuracy scores were the dependent variables. These measures are 
typically used in lie detection research. But because they share variance, we also used 
nonparametric signal detection measures B”D and A’ to measure the effects of response 
bias and accuracy independently of each other (see the Appendix for more information). 
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Greenhouse Geisser corrections were used in all instances where assumptions of sphericity 
were violated. 
Results 
Testing the Behavioural Account 
Two 2 (Veracity: truthful/deceptive statement) x 3 (Presented Response: 1st/2nd/3rd) 
x 2 (Viewing Direction: direct/reverse) Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) with repeated 
measures on the first two variables were conducted. The first ANOVA on the PJT revealed 
truthful statements were more often judged truthful (M = .62, SD = .02) than deceptive 
statements (M = .53, SD = .02), F (1, 81) = 16.55, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.17. A significant main 
effect of presented response, F (1.62, 131.58) = 21.20, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.21, reflected a 
decrease in truth judgments over time that was significant between the first (M = .61, SD = 
.16) and the second (M = .56, SD = .16) and between the first and the third (M = .54, SD = 
.17) response of the speakers (t (82) = 3.48, p < .001, d = 0.40, and t (82) = 4.08, p < .001, d 
= 0.46, respectively), but not between the second and third responses, t (82) = 0.60, p = 
.155, d = 0.08. A linear contrast analysis found a linear effect of presented response, F (1, 
246) = 8.88, p = .003, ηp2 = 0.04, but no quadratic effect, F (1, 246) = 1.26, p = .262, ηp2 = 
0.01. The Presented Response x Viewing Direction interaction was not significant, F (1.62, 
131.58) = 2.71, p = .081, ηp2 = 0.03, indicating that the PJT decreased over time regardless 
of the order in which the responses and their corresponding behaviours were presented 
(separate analyses for each viewing direction condition indeed revealed that the effect of 
presented response was significant for both the direct, F (1.58, 68.02) = 5.36, p = .011, ηp2 
= 0.11, and the reverse condition, F (1.66, 63.09) = 16.13, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.30). No other 
main effects or interactions were statistically significant. These findings support a cognitive 
rather than a behavioural influence on judgments.  
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The second ANOVA on accuracy scores revealed accuracy was greater for truths (M 
= .62, SD = .02) than for lies (M = .48, SD = .02), F (1, 81) = 20.64, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.20. 
This was moderated by the presented response, F (1.62, 131.58) = 21.20, p < .001, ηp2 = 
0.21. When judging truths, accuracy was higher for the first than for the second, t (81) = 
3.58, p < .001, d = 0.34, and third presented responses, t (81) = 4.05, p < .001, d = 0.37. In 
contrast, when judging lies accuracy was lower for the first than for the third presented 
response, t (81) = 3.79, p < .001, d = -0.34. No other main effects or interactions were 
significant. 
Additional analyses. A decrease in bias could cause a decrease in accuracy. To 
separate the effects of accuracy and bias, we used signal detection measures. A 3 (Presented 
Response) x 2 (Viewing Direction) ANOVA on B”D yielded a significant main effect of 
presented response, F (1.53, 123.82) = 17.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .181. The truth bias declined 
between the first (M = .39, SD = .47) and both the second (M = .21, SD = .48), t (81) = 
4.16, p < .001, d = 0.38, and third rating (M = .14, SD = .52), t (81) = 4.85, p < .001, d = 
0.50, but not between the second and third ratings, t (81) = 2.10, p = .105, d = 0.14. The 
Presented Response x Viewing Direction interaction predicted by the behavioural account 
was not significant, F (1.53, 123.82) = 2.31, p = .116, ηp2 = 0.03. A similar ANOVA on A’ 
revealed no significant effects on accuracy. 
We wanted to make sure the lack of a Presented Response x Viewing Direction 
interaction on the PJT reflected the real absence of an effect rather than a lack of statistical 
power. We calculated a Bayes Factor using a Cauchy prior distribution with a scaling factor 
for the fixed effects of 0.5 over the standardised effect sizes, and a scaling factor of 1.0 for 
the nuisance variables. We compared a complex model with the Presented Response x 
Viewing Direction interaction with a simpler model without this interaction (see the 
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Appendix for motivation of the scaling factor and for details on model specification). The 
analysis revealed that in order to prefer the more complex model we would need prior odds 
favouring it greater than about 45. This strongly supported the true lack of an interaction 
effect. A Bayes factor calculated in the same way for accuracy scores revealed that the data 
were 100 times more likely under the null hypothesis. 
Summary. The bias decreased over successive judgments regardless of whether the 
statements were presented in the recorded order or in the opposite order, suggesting the 
decrease cannot be explained by changes in the speakers’ behaviours over consecutive 
answers.  
Testing the Default-Interventionist and Parallel-Competition Models 
Because the data were not easily amenable to traditional F-tests, a model comparison 
approach was used to assess the effect of cumulative viewing time on bias and accuracy. 
Two generalised logistic mixed-effects models (GLMEMs) were created, one with all the 
manipulated variables and the other additionally including the fixed effect of Cumulative 
Viewing Time. A significant difference in the predictive ability of these two models would 
indicate that the addition of cumulative viewing duration significantly improved the fit of 
the data. It did not, neither for the PJT, χ2 (1) = 0.03, p = .861, nor for accuracy, χ2 (1) = 
1.22, p = .290. The simpler model without viewing time is preferred. 
Similarly, the duration of the first presented response could predict neither the PJT, χ2 
(1) = 0.77, p = .381, nor accuracy, χ2 (1) = 0.67, p = .411, in judging that response. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 established the change in bias is attributable to the rater, not to a change 
in the speakers’ behaviour. Consistent with both HAM and step-by-step response mode 
explanations, there was initially a high truth bias that decreased over successive judgments, 
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regardless of the order the responses were presented. Overall accuracy did not change over 
ratings. 
Is the decrease in bias caused by the act of making multiple judgments (step-by-step 
account), or by the amount of time raters have to process the information (HAM account)? 
Consistent with research in persuasion (Thompson et al., 2003; see also Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1993) and contrary to a time-based HAM, processing time could not predict how 
likely people were to believe speakers were telling the truth; thus, it appears that the act of 
rating over several occasions reduces the truth bias. However, the present findings do not 
allow us to dismiss HAMs altogether. We must consider a third class of HAMs identified 
by Evans (2007), pre-emptive conflict resolution models. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Pre-emptive conflict resolution models do not propose that analytical processing 
will be seen only late in the judgment process. Instead, they propose a “decision” is made at 
the outset as to whether heuristic or systematic processing will be used (Evans, 2007). 
Different communication channels make different demands on cognitive resources, thereby 
making heuristic or analytic processing more likely. Visual cues are easier to process and 
require fewer cognitive resources; therefore, they can be processed heuristically (Reinhard, 
2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, 2010; Stiff et al., 1989). Verbal cues require greater 
cognitive resources (Gilbert & Krull, 1988); therefore, analytical processing is needed to 
process these cues (Chaiken, 1980; Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2010). If the truth 
bias results from heuristic processing, then visual cues should yield more of a truth bias 
than verbal cues (Burgoon, Blair & Strom, 2008). Further, because analytical processing 
takes a systematic approach towards forming judgments, accuracy should be higher when 
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verbal cues (processed analytically) are available (Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 
2008). 
We tested whether the findings from Experiment 1 would change depending on the 
communication channel. Data from the direct-viewing, audio-visual condition of 
Experiment 1 were compared with data from similar participants with access to only visual 
(video condition) or only audio (audio condition) information from the same videotape. 
Consistent with HAMs, we predicted that: 
(a) More truth judgments would be made in the video (because heuristic processing 
would be engaged) than in the audio condition (systematic procession), with the audio-
visual condition located between these.  
(b) Accuracy would be lowest in the video condition and highest in the audio 
condition.  
(c) The decrease in truth judgments would be weakest in the video condition –
because switching to systematic processing would be difficult with no revealing verbal 
information available– and strongest in the audio condition.  
(d) Accuracy would increase over consecutive judgments primarily in the audio 
condition, but not in the video condition. 
Method 
Psychology undergraduates were allocated to the video (n = 22; 15 female; age M = 
20.55, SD = 4.18), audio (n = 27; 17 female; age M = 20.33, SD = 2.24) or audio-visual 
conditions (n = 24; 15 female; age M = 20.21, SD = 2.32; data of these participants came 
from Experiment 1; they were in the first group in the direct-viewing condition). Sex and 
age distributions did not differ between the groups.  
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The procedure closely followed Experiment 1, except for the modality manipulation 
and the fact that only the direct viewing direction videos were used.  
Results 
Truth Bias 
A 2 (Veracity: truthful/deceptive statement) x 3 (Response: 1st/2nd/3rd) x 3 
(Channel: video/audio/audio-visual) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first 
two variables was run on the PJT. The PJT decreased over successive ratings F (1.74, 
121.55) = 7.10, p = .002, ηp2 = .092 (Table 1), but contrary to predictions, neither the 
channel main effect, F (2, 70) = 2.70, p = .074, ηp2 = .072, nor the Response x Channel 
interaction were significant either, F (3.47, 121.55) = 1.10, p = .357, ηp2 = .030. The 
reduction in the PJT was weakest in the video condition, as predicted, for which none of the 
pairwise comparisons were significant (see Table 1). A Response x Channel ANOVA run 
on B”D confirmed these findings, and Bayes factors (with the data shifting plausibility 
towards the null by a factor of 18; see Appendix for details) provided strong evidence 
against the alternative hypotheses (these analyses are available from the first author). 
Replicating Experiment 1, a GLMEM with maximal random effects determined that 
cumulative viewing duration could not add any predictive value to the model in fitting the 
PJT, χ2 (1) = 0.07, p = .790, in either the video, χ2 (1) = 0.17, p = .680, or audio channels, χ2 
(1) = 0.08, p = .772. Similarly, there was no significant effect of duration on the PJT to the 
first response, χ2 (1) = 0.82, p = .364, regardless of whether only video, χ2 (1) = 1.11, p = 
.293, or only audio information was present, χ2 (1) = 0.82, p = .366. In each case, the 
simpler model should be preferred. 
Accuracy 
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A similar ANOVA on accuracy revealed that raters were more accurate in judging 
truths (M = .58, SD = .02) than lies (M = .46, SD = .02), F (1, 70) = 14.90, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.175. This was moderated by Response, F (1.73, 121.43) = 8.81, p = .001, ηp2 = .112. 
Accuracy for lies increased between the 1st and the 2nd response but not further, while 
accuracy for truths decreased non-significantly throughout successive ratings (Table 2). 
Neither the channel main effect, F (2, 70) = 0.85, p = .431, ηp2 = .024, nor the Channel x 
Response interaction, F (3.57, 125.06) = 0.78, p = .526, ηp2 = .022, were significant. A 
Response x Channel ANOVA run on A’ yielded no significant effects, and Bayes factors 
(shifting the odds in favour of the null by a factor of 2.59) provided evidence against the 
alternative hypotheses (analyses available from the first author). 
GLMEM comparisons found that cumulative viewing duration could not predict 
accuracy, χ2 (1) < 0.02, p = .878, in either the audio, χ2 (1) < 0.01, p > .999, or video 
conditions, χ2 (1) = 0.04, p = .840. Again, the duration of the first portion of the statement 
could not predict accuracy when rating the first response, χ2 (1) = 2.12, p = .145. If only 
audio information was available, the duration of the first response could predict accuracy, 
χ2 (1) = 5.90, B = 0.01, p = .015, but if only video information was presented it could not, χ2 
(1) = 1.21, p = .272.  
Discussion 
There was little support for a heuristic processing account of the truth bias: accuracy 
and bias were similar across all three cue-type conditions, and changes over successive 
ratings did not match HAM-based predictions (Evans, 2007). Also, the truth bias did not 
decline with longer viewing times, as would be expected by the two classes of HAM that 
claim a shift from heuristic to analytical processing over time. Equally, accuracy could not 
be predicted from viewing time, with the only exception of the audio condition. This latter 
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finding may look consistent with an HAM, but HAMs explicitly predict a reduction in bias 
when switching to analytical processing; this was not supported across Experiments 1 and 
2. 
The present findings question both the behavioural account (Experiment 1) and the 
HAM account (Experiments 1 and 2), and are consistent with a step-by-step account: it is 
the number of judgments made, not the amount of processing time, what explains the shift 
in bias. In Experiment 3, we directly contrasted the predictions of the HAM and the step-
by-step accounts. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
According to a HAM, when using very short clips bias would be high and accuracy 
low because time is needed for an analytical process to run to completion. For instance, 
interrupting participants’ processing leads to truth biased responding (Gilbert et al., 1990), 
potentially indicative of heuristic processing. But according to a step-by-step account there 
should be a progressive decrease in bias regardless of whether the clips are long or short. 
In Experiment 3, we used short (8 s) segments of each of the senders’ responses. If 
the decrease in bias is detected with 8 s responses, this will be the result of making repeated 
judgments rather than of switching from heuristic to systematic processing. We also used a 
long clips control condition.  
Method 
Eighty-two undergraduates (63 female; age M = 19.29, SD = 3.22, range 18 - 36 
years) participated in this experiment in the context of a Social Psychology lecture. 
Materials and Procedure 
The booklet and stimulus material used in Experiments 1 and 2 were employed. The 
procedure followed Experiment 1, except here all participants watched the speakers’ 
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responses in the recorded order and viewed either the full-length responses of each speaker 
(long clips condition, n = 49 participants) or only the first 8 s of each response (short clips 
condition, n = 33). Sex and age distributions did not differ significantly between the two 
conditions.  
Results 
Analyses were run on the PJT and B”D to assess bias, as well as on accuracy scores 
and A’ to assess accuracy. In order to avoid unnecessary reiteration and complexity, only 
the analyses of the signal detection theory measures are presented here. They were 
preferred because of the independence of B”D and A’ and because they are simpler. Both 
sets of analyses tell the same story. Missing analyses are available from the first author. 
Truth Bias 
A 3 (Response: 1st/2nd/3rd) x 2 (Clip Length: short/long) ANOVA on B”D scores 
revealed a significant main effect of response, F (1.62, 129.58) = 4.63, p = .017, ηp2 = 0.06. 
The truth bias declined form the first (M = .22, SD = .52) to the third response (M = .06, SD 
= .52), t (81) = 2.51, p = .042, d = 0.81. Neither the main effect of clip length nor the 
predicted Response x Clip Length interaction were significant, both ps > .143. Thus, 
response bias declined across the statement regardless of clip length.  
A Bayes factor with all the variables in the preceding ANOVA revealed that in order 
to prefer a model with the interaction term over a model without it we would need prior 
odds greater than 2.9 favouring it. This offered moderate support for the null hypothesis of 
no interaction effect, supporting the step-by-step account. 
Accuracy 
Another Response x Clip Length ANOVA was conducted on A’ scores. The response 
main effect was significant, F (1.97, 157.45) = 10.96, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.12, but it also 
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interacted with clip length, F (1.97, 157.45) = 9.81, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.11. When rating long 
clips, accuracy did not change significantly across responses (M = .60, SD = .20; M = .57, 
SD = .19; and M = .62, SD = .18; for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd response, respectively), all ps > 
.181. For short clips, there was an increase in accuracy from the first (M = .45, SD = .20) to 
the second response (M = .59, SD = .19), t (32) = 4.06, p < .001, d = 0.72, with no further 
increase (for the third response, M = .63, SD = .18). The main effect of clip length was not 
statistically significant, F (1, 80) = 1.12, p = .294, d = 0.24 (for short clips: M = .56, SD = 
.16; for long clips: M = .60, SD = .15). 
In summary, response bias decreased across rating points, and clip length did not 
moderate this effect. Clip length influenced accuracy rates: with 8 s clips mean accuracy 
was below .50; longer viewing durations increased accuracy to approximately .60. 
Discussion 
The HAM claims analytical processing is slow and requires more time than heuristic 
processing (Evans, 2007). However, we found bias decreased over ratings, regardless of 
whether raters watched short or long clips. These findings support a step-by-step process. 
Interestingly, accuracy increased for short clips (in particular from the first to the 
second response) but not for long clips. There are at least two explanations for the increased 
accuracy and reduced bias in the short clip condition. The raters may have switched from 
heuristic to systematic processing at some point between 8 s and 16 or 24 s. Alternatively, 
the low accuracy rate at the first rating point for the short clips condition may simply reflect 
that there was not enough information available at this point to make a reasoned judgment. 
Additional information provided during the second 8 s response may have permitted an 
increase in accuracy without necessarily reflecting a shift in processing modes. The thin 
slices were used to prevent switching to analytic processing claimed by Masip et al. (2009) 
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to require statements longer than 30 s, but we cannot rule out the possibility of analytical 
processing. However, because bias, our primary prediction arising from the HAM, could 
not be predicted by clip length, a non-HAM based account is preferred. 
In any case, it is clear that a HAM account cannot explain the decrease in bias for 
long responses. If there is any switch between heuristic and systematic processing, it 
happened at some point between 8 and 32 s. The mean duration of the entire first response 
was 50 s, meaning analytical processing should already have been engaged and so a 
decrease in bias should not be seen. Therefore, as in Experiments 1 and 2, the HAM 
account cannot explain the decrease in bias. Instead, the data support a step-by-step process 
account. In Experiment 4, we considered a mechanism that could explain why step-by-step 
responding has this effect.  
EXPERIMENT 4 
Masip et al.’s (2009) study and Experiments 1 through 3 here evidenced a decline in 
truth bias between the first and second response, but no further decline. Why would step-
by-step responding lead to this effect?  
When a speaker makes multiple responses, it is possible to compare them. Raters use 
consistency more often than any other cue when comparisons can be made (Granhag & 
Strömwall, 1999, 2000a, 2001b). Consistency seemed a plausible candidate for explaining 
the decline in truth bias over time. Because raters perceive inconsistencies even when they 
are not present (Granhag & Strömwall, 2001b), raters could shift their judgments towards 
deception. Having established inconsistency between the first and second response, there 
may be no additional effect of continued perceived inconsistency by the third response. 
Thus, we predicted a greater decline in the PJT between the first and second response for 
speakers perceived as inconsistent than for those perceived as consistent. 
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Method 
Participants 
Consistency raters. Forty-nine undergraduates (40 females; age M = 19.04, SD = 
2.78, range 17 - 30 years) rated the stimulus videos for verbal and nonverbal consistency.  
Veracity judges. We examined the influence of perceived consistency on the lie-
truth judgments of participants rating the full version of Masip et al.’s (2006) Video Set A1 
in previous studies. This involved 14 raters in Masip et al.’s (2009) experiment, 83 raters of 
Experiment 1 above, and 49 raters in the long clip condition of Experiment 3, amounting to 
146 undergraduates (117 female; age M = 20.35, SD = 2.76, range 18 - 36 years).  
Additionally, in Experiment 2, 22 undergraduates (15 female; age M = 20.55, SD = 4.18, 
range 18 to 38 years) were exposed to only visible information from the same video set, 
and 27 undergraduates (17 female; age M = 20.33, SD = 2.24, range 18 -28 years) were 
provided with only audio information. 
Procedure 
Consistency raters received an instruction sheet with definitions of verbal 
consistency, “the extent to which the same details or similar details are repeated over the 
responses with no contradiction”, and nonverbal consistency, “the extent to which the same 
behaviours or similar behaviours are repeated over the responses”. They watched Video Set 
A1 and provided ratings of verbal and nonverbal consistency for each speaker after viewing 
two responses, and then again after viewing all three responses. Ratings were given on a 1 
(Not consistent at all (Inconsistent)) to 7 (Fully consistent) scale.  
Consistency. The consistency ratings were used to median split the clips as high or 
low in consistency within each of the 2 (channel: verbal/nonverbal) x 2 (rating point: after 
the second (t2) or third (t3) response) cells. Ratings across the verbal and nonverbal 
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channels were highly correlated. Cronbach’s alphas were calculated separately for each of 
the Consistency x Rating Point x Veracity cells, and ranged between .90 and 1.00. 
Therefore, ratings were collapsed across channels. 
Coding. Truth judgments were coded as 1 and lie judgments as 0. Then, the change 
in the PJT was calculated as the judgment at the second (or third) response minus the 
judgment at the first response. A shift from a truth (1) to a lie (0) judgment was coded as 0 
– 1 =  -1; a shift from a lie to a truth judgment was coded as 1 – 0 = 1, and no change in 
judgment was coded either as 0 – 0 = 0 or 1 – 1 = 0. Thus, a negative value indicates a shift 
towards a lie response and a positive value indicates a shift towards a truth response. This 
new variable, judgment change, was the dependent variable. 
Results and Discussion 
Diagnosticity 
A 2 (Veracity: truthful/deceptive statement) x 2 (Rating Time: t2/t3) within subjects 
ANOVA revealed that truths were rated as more consistent (M = 4.50, SD = 0.74) than lies 
(M = 4.71, SD = 0.70), F (1, 48) = 5.24, p = .026, ηp2 = 0.10. 
Consistency use 
Three 2 (Consistency: low/high) x 2 (Veracity: truthful/deceptive statement) x 2 
(Rating Time: t2/t3) within-participants ANOVAs were conducted on the PJT change.1 The 
first ANOVA was conducted on Masip et al.’s (2009) data, the second on the data of 
Experiment 1, and the third on the ratings of Experiment 3’s full-length clips. The main 
effect of consistency was significant in all the three ANOVAs (Table 3; more detailed 
results are available from the first author). A meta-analysis of all three experiments yielded 
a weighted Hedges’s unbiased g = -0.51, 95% CI [-0.73, -0.29], z = 4.46, p < .001, which is 
a medium effect size (Cohen, 1988). A homogeneity analysis showed that the sample of 
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effect sizes was homogeneous, and hence variability was caused by sampling error alone, Q 
= 2.37, p = .31. In short, across the three studies consistency had a substantial impact on the 
decrease in the PJT (see Figure 1). 
Consistency ratings were collected separately for verbal and nonverbal behaviour. We 
examine whether nonverbal consistency predicted the decline in the PJT in the video 
condition of Experiment 2, and whether verbal consistency did the same in the audio 
condition of Experiment 2. A Nonverbal Consistency x Veracity x Rating Time ANOVA 
did not yield any significant effect for the video condition of Experiment 2; however, a 
similar ANOVA conducted for audio-only clips revealed a significant main effect of verbal 
consistency, F (1, 26) = 6.45, p = .017, ηp2 = 0.20. The decrease in truth judgments was 
stronger in verbally inconsistent (M = -.10, SD = .16) than in verbally consistent (M = -.01, 
SD = .14) statements (Figure 1). 
In summary, the analyses of several studies and experimental conditions provide 
compelling evidence that consistency guides veracity judgments across multiple responses 
of the same sender. Verbal consistency may contribute more to this effect than nonverbal 
consistency. 
 Importantly, we do not claim that a consistency step-by-step account is necessarily 
orthogonal to a HAM account, but rather that the HAM account failed to explain the truth 
bias in three experiments and that the step-by-step account received support in all reported 
experiments. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In making lie-truth judgments, raters show a bias towards believing (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006). One line of research suggests that this truth bias is produced by a system 
that initially is biased towards believing with the short 30 s clips typically shown to lie 
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detection raters, but with longer statements may use a more effortful evaluation (Masip et 
al., 2006, 2009, 2010; see also Gilbert, 1991). We tested the claims of these heuristic-
analytic models (HAMs) as presented by Evans (2007). 
We first considered whether the shift in judgments is a result of a shift in behaviour 
over the course of lengthier statements rather than the product of the rater’s processing. The 
behavioural account was not supported. We then considered a stringent test of the HAM: 
the amount of processing time should predict the degree of bias or accuracy. Across three 
experiments we found this was not the case. In addition, we found that even when there was 
no initial bias (video condition of Experiment 2), raters were still less inclined to believe 
the speaker by the second and third judgments. These findings question default-
interventionist or parallel-competition HAM explanations. Pre-emptive conflict resolution 
models, which claim an early selection of processing routes, could not explain the decline 
in truth bias either. The types of information available in Experiment 2 (visual, audio, or 
audio-visual) did not result in the predicted choice of heuristic or analytical processing 
from the outset. Instead, in all of these experiments the decrease in bias was better 
predicted by the mere act of making multiple judgments, in line with a step-by-step 
response mode account. Other research has shown that even at much larger time scales, 
from 1 to 5 months later, there is a decline in truth bias with subsequent ratings of the 
speaker’s statement (Anderson, DePaulo, & Ansfield, 2002).  
In Experiment 4, we sought to understand why step-by-step responding decreases the 
truth bias, and found that people use perceived consistency: when the speaker’s responses 
appear inconsistent, raters shift away from a truth-biased position. This finding is in line 
with previous research. Granhag and Strömwall (2000b) found that 60% of the participants 
used consistency when rating a speaker’s veracity from different statements made by the 
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same speaker. Other research also shows that both practitioners and laypersons believe 
inconsistency indicates deception (Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004).  
Here we found that, across four experiments, perceived inconsistency explained the 
decrease in truth judgments over the course of the speaker’s statement. It seems therefore 
well established that raters repeatedly judging veracity during a statement make within-
statement comparisons. In addition, we discovered that perceived inconsistency decreases 
the initial tendency to make truth judgments. 
The findings are consistent with truth-default theory (Levine, 2014), which proposes 
people default to a truth belief unless they perceive a ‘trigger’ that leads them to consider 
the possibility of deception. In the current study, the trigger would be the perceived 
inconsistency in the statement. 
The findings are also consistent with the smart lie detector account (Street & 
Richardson, in press; Street, 2014) that argues people make use of generalised rules 
(perceived inconsistency) to make informed judgments in low-diagnostic environments. In 
line with this, we found raters made use of perceived inconsistency, a diagnostic cue in this 
study. In this sense, it might be considered a smart heuristic (Gigerenzer, Todd & The ABC 
Research Group, 1999).2 
The current findings are not intended to be an all-or-nothing challenge against the 
HAM account, but rather a piece of the puzzle. One possible limiting factor of the current 
findings is that we chose to focus on Evans’ (2007) taxonomy of HAMs that make temporal 
predictions. However, analytical processing is not only slower than heuristic processing, 
but also non-automatic, requiring motivation and cognitive capacity. Other research has 
examined the role of motivation or cognitive capacity on lie detection or deception 
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judgments (e.g., Millar & Millar, 1997; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, 2010; Stiff, Kim, & 
Ramesh, 1992). 
Our findings have practical implications both for researchers and lay citizens. 
Researchers investigating deception detection should use longer clips, as clips shorter than 
87 s (average accumulated time by the end of Response 2) might bias judgments towards 
truthfulness and might provide a distorted picture of the participants’ response tendencies 
and detection accuracy. Lay people should avoid hasty judgments in assessing veracity 
because they produce (truth-)biased judgments.  
Conclusions 
We focused on the processes involved in the truth bias. Truth judgments are often 
high initially, and then decline progressively over successive ratings. We showed that a 
HAM-based account could not explain either the initial truth bias or its decline. Instead, the 
reduced bias was attributable to the act of making multiple judgments, and reflected the use 
of a simple rule: seemingly inconsistent statements were less likely to be judged as truthful 
by the point of the second judgment. 
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Footnote  
1 To preserve the continuous nature of the data we also conducted a set of mixed 
effects model comparisons. The findings mirror those of the ANOVAs. These analyses are 
available from the first author on request. 
2 It is important to note here that a heuristic process, a proposed mechanism that is 
fast and engages in relatively effortless thought, must be differentiated from a heuristic, a 
simplified, rule built up from an individual’s prior history with the world (Street, 2013). 
The findings suggest the use of a simple heuristic (consistency), but do not support a 
heuristic processing model. 
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Table 1 
Mean (Standard Deviations) PJT in each Channel in Experiment 2 
 
Response 1 Response 2 Response 3 
Video .51a (.14) .48a (.14) .50a (.16) 
Audio .61a (.23) .55b (.22) .56b (.26) 
Audiovisual .60a (.24) .57ab (.23) .54b (.27) 
Across Channels .58a (.14) .53b (.14) 53b (.16) 
Note. Means sharing a common subscript are not statistically different at α = .05 
according to Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-tests. 
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Table 2 
Mean (Standard Deviations) Accuracy for Truths and Lies in 
Experiment 2 
 Response 1 Response 2 Response 3 
Lies .43a (.21) .48b (.17) .48b (.20) 
Truths .61a (.02) .57a (.02) .56a (.21) 
Note. Means sharing a common subscript are not statistically different at α = .05 
according to Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-tests. 
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Table 3 
Mean Change in the PJT for the Low versus High Consistency Items, and Main Effects of Consistency in the 
Consistency x Veracity x Rating Time ANOVAs 
 Low Consistency High Consistency     
 Mean SD Mean SD F df p η2 
Masip et al. (2009) -.19 .15 -.01 .15 7.35 1, 13 .018 .36 
Experiment 1 -.10 .17 -.03 .14 9.12 1, 82 .003 .10 
Experiment 3 -.12 .18 -.03 .15 8.39 1, 48 .006 .15 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. The change in the PJT (overall) for high versus low consistency items, separated 
by experiment. Negative values indicate a shift away from a truth response. Whiskers 
denote one standard error. 
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Appendix 
Some readers may be unfamiliar with some of the analytical approaches used in this 
article. These approaches are described below. 
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) Measures 
SDT measures calculate response bias and accuracy independently (Stanislaw & 
Todorov, 1999). We measured bias as B”D (Donaldson, 1992) and accuracy as A’ (Rae, 
1976). B”D ranges from -1 to +1, with 0 indicating no bias. Negative values reflect a bias 
toward responding lie and positive values a bias toward truth. A’ is bounded between 0 and 
1, with 0.5 reflecting chance accuracy. 
Bayes Factors 
The lack of significance in a statistical test could result from an underpowered study 
or from the lack of a real effect. The Bayes factor circumvents this issue by asking how 
probable one model versus another is, given the available data. Data can show support for 
or against the null or instead show the lack of an effect due to no evidence in either 
direction. Values near 1.0 indicate lack of power, while values of approximately 3 (and 
larger) indicate moderate evidence in favour of a specified (alternative or null) hypothesis. 
To illustrate, in Experiment 1 we compared two models: (a) a complex model with 
Veracity, Presented Response, Viewing Direction, and their interactions as fixed effects, 
with the PJT as the outcome variable, and with fully specified random effects for raters and 
speakers, and (b) a simpler model with the Presented Response x Viewing Direction 
interaction removed. In order to prefer the more complex model, we would need prior odds 
favouring it greater than about 45. 
We used the BayesFactor package version 0.9.4 (Morey & Rouder, 2013) designed 
for the R statistical environment (R Development Core Team, 2011). A prior Cauchy scale 
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of r = 0.5 over the effect sizes was selected; this prior includes 50% of the prior mass 
within the range of effect sizes between -0.5 and 0.5. This scaling factor is recommended 
by the BayesFactor documentation for most experimental designs given that it is readily 
computed and gives a stable integration of the likelihood. This relatively narrow prior is 
appropriate for the somewhat small effect sizes observed in lie detection research, and is 
used for all reported calculations. Fully specified random effects were included for raters 
and speakers in all analyses, as in the case of the generalised logistic mixed effects models 
described below. 
Generalised Logistic Mixed Effects Models 
Generalised logistic mixed effects models were used because the data were not 
always amenable to F-tests. We use the analysis from Experiment 1 on the cumulative 
viewing duration as an example here.  
The fixed effect of Cumulative Viewing Time was added to a simpler model that 
included Veracity, Presented Response, and Viewing Direction, with the video-recorded 
speaker and the observer as random effects, each with its own random intercept. The 
random slopes for the speaker were Cumulative Viewing Time, Presented Response, and 
Viewing Direction. The random slopes for the observer were the Cumulative Viewing 
Time, Veracity and Presented Response. That is, slopes for all variables were permitted 
provided a slope was possible to model (i.e., provided the speaker or observer could be 
found in more than one cell for the given variable), resulting in a maximally specified 
mixed effects model. Restricted maximum likelihood estimates of the models were based 
on the Laplace approximation. 
 
